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ARE CREDIT UNIONS JUST SMALL BANKS?
 
DETERMINANTS OF







INTRODUCTION AND PREVIOUS LITERATURE
 
In recent years, economists studying local banking markets have begun to examine 
the competitive role potentially played by credit unions. However, how to model this 
competitive discipline remains an open question. Despite differences in organizational 
form, regulatory regimes, and possible goals, credit unions and banks clearly compete 
in the market for consumer loans. And while they are often relatively small, many 
credit unions are larger than some banks with whom they compete. This study both 
examines common inﬂ  uences on bank and credit union loan pricing and tests for 
residual differences after accounting for these common inﬂ  uences. 
Despite an early study by Navratil [1981] suggesting that credit unions responded 
to market conditions in much the same way as other ﬁ  nancial institutions, and work 
by Hannan [1984] and Rhoades [1987] on competition between banks and thrifts, 
only recently has the interaction between banks and credit unions begun drawing 
sustained attention from economists. Emmons and Schmid [2000], using county-level 
data, examine 2-way intertemporal linkages between credit union “participation rates” 
and market concentration of the commercial banking sector to support the view that 
the two types of institutions compete in the market for consumer deposits;1 similarly, 
Feinberg and Rahman [2001] ﬁ  nd that credit union and bank rates for two consumer 
loan products can each be shown to be inﬂ  uenced by the other. 
Tokle and Tokle [2000] found a competitive inﬂ  uence of credit unions on bank 
CD rates offered in Idaho and Montana, while Feinberg [2003] has found impacts of 
credit unions on consumer loan rates over a broad national sample of local markets2 
– and for individual banks within those markets – in the 1992-1998 period.
What has not been done to date is an examination of the extent to which bank and 
credit union consumer loan pricing are inﬂ  uenced by common factors, and of differ-648 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
ences that remain after accounting for these factors. That is the focus of this study; 
we analyze a combined sample of 100 banks and 187 credit unions in 68 U.S. markets 
over the 1992-98 period to explain loan rates for two types of consumer loans.
While the number of credit unions has steadily shrunk from the early 1970s until 
now, they have expanded in terms of their number of members, total deposits, and local 
market shares. Larger individual credit union size has resulted from an expansion of 
the customer base and mergers among credit unions. Importantly, credit unions have 
expanded their service base and now most provide a wide range of retail ﬁ  nancial 
services (including checking accounts, certiﬁ  cates of deposit, consumer and small 
business loans, and assorted ﬁ  nancial transactions) to their members.3 
This increase in credit union size and broadening of functions suggest a possible 
similarity in credit union and bank behavior. However, despite their expansion, credit 
unions have a unique characteristic that makes them different from both banks and 
thrifts. Credit unions are cooperative non-proﬁ  t organizations, and their motivation 
(and hence behavior) may differ from that of proﬁ  t maximizing banks.4 They also 
have cost advantages arising from tax treatment, volunteer labor, and sponsorship 
by associations or employers.
In this paper, we will try to address this issue from the lending market perspective. 
We consider two types of loans important to most credit unions (though likely of less 
importance to banks): 24-month non-credit-card unsecured loans; and 48-month new 
vehicle loans. These loan types are the only ones for which historical data is available 
for both banks and credit unions; furthermore, we know of no source of comparable 
ﬁ  rm-level data for other ﬁ  nancial institutions (e.g., savings and loans, for auto loans, 
or consumer ﬁ  nance companies, for small unsecured loans). The next section discusses 
the econometric methodology used in the study. The section after that describes the 
data set and sources. And ﬁ  nally we present empirical ﬁ  ndings. The concluding sec-
tion discusses the results and suggests some policy implications.
 
ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION
A long literature in Industrial Organization (discussed, for example, in Scherer 
and Ross [1990]) suggests that a proﬁ  t-maximizing ﬁ  rm’s price-cost margin will depend 
on market share, proxies for the degree of competition in the market (which would 
include both market concentration and entry conditions), and market-speciﬁ  c effects 
(as proxies for price elasticity). Given our interest in explaining prices rather than 
margins, cost proxies also need to be considered. 
While the typical oligopoly model discussed in the literature referred to above is 
a static one, it would not be surprising if pricing decisions by both banks and credit 
unions are based in some part on past decisions. We allow for a dynamic process by 
including the one-quarter lagged loan rate as an explanatory variable. In practice, 
prices often take time to respond to changes in demand, cost and the competitive 
environment; in particular, some have noted that unpaid credit union boards meet 
infrequently to consider changing loan rates which would suggest some inertia in 
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Let Pt
* be the loan rate predicted according to fundamentals at any period t 
whereas the actual loan rate is Pt. Then, a standard partial adjustment model can 
be written as
(1)     Pt - Pt-1 = δ (Pt
* - Pt-1)
That is, actual one quarter adjustment is some percentage (δ) of predicted adjust-
ment, with lower values of δ reﬂ  ecting greater inertia in pricing behavior. Substituting 
in Pt
* = f (X), where X represents the vector of explanatory variables, we have,
(2)     Pt = δ f (X) + (1 - δ) Pt-1 
In regression speciﬁ  cations including lagged loan rates the estimated coefﬁ  cient of 
Pt-1 is (1 - δ). A regression coefﬁ  cient estimate closer to one implies an adjustment pa-
rameter closer to zero, hence greater inertia. Also implied by this speciﬁ  cation is that 
coefﬁ  cient estimates of other explanatory variables are the product of their predicted 
impact on the fully-adjusted price and the adjustment parameter. For policy purposes 
we may be more interested in the former (what may be seen as a “long-run’ impact) and 
this can be obtained by dividing the estimated coefﬁ  cient by δ. To deal with dynamics 
appropriately, we employ for our estimation technique an instrumental variable (IV) 
random effects generalized least squares (GLS) model corrected for autocorrelation 
(the IV approach intended to guard against endogeneity of the lagged loan rate).5
To explain consumer loan rates by both banks and credit unions we include a 
number of market and institution-level explanatory variables, with all variables 
expressed in natural logarithms.6 These can be viewed as proxies for the cost, mar-
ket share, and conjectural variation terms in the expression above. Such industrial 
organization variables have frequently been used in studies of bank and credit union 
loan and deposit rate setting (see, e.g., Rhoades [1987], Hannan [1984], Gilbert [1984], 
Hannan and Liang [1995], Tokle and Tokle [2000], Feinberg [2003]).
With respect to cost, we control for the cost of funds (COF) by a simple average, 
varying over time but not cross-sectionally, of the Federal Funds rate and a national 
average of the credit union cost of funds; while it might be preferable to explain mar-
gins of the loan rate over cost, this was not possible given that loan rate observations 
were available for individual banks while COF is simply a national average (included 
simply to capture macroeconomic trends). Economies of scale available to be exploited 
by the ﬁ  nancial institution are proxied by deposit size (DEP) -- total deposits of all 
branches of the institution within a particular market (while there may also be bank 
advantages associated with asset size, these should be picked up in part by the bank 
holding company variable mentioned below). To control for the possible inﬂ  uence of 
ﬁ  rm-level market power, the local market share of the institution (MS), measured in 
terms of deposits,7 is included.
It is typical in industrial organization studies to assume that conjectural varia-
tion, or more generally the likelihood of collusive behavior in a market, can be roughly 
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the three largest non-credit union institutions operating in that market (CR3),8 with 
shares based on deposits, predicting a positive impact on loan rates, and as a measure 
of ease of new entry (and the pro-competitive impact that may have) the state credit 
union share (STCUSHARE) -- the ratio of potential credit union members to adult 
population of the state where the institution is operating. This latter variable has 
performed well in previous work [Feinberg, 2003] and is viewed as a proxy for the lack 
of regulatory or other entry barriers to credit union expansion into markets within 
that state; we anticipate that a greater state-level credit union share will indicate 
a greater supply elasticity from potential entrants confronting ﬁ  nancial institutions 
in our sample.
To allow for cross-market impacts of large multibank operations we include a bank 
holding company dummy variable (BHC) which takes a value of one if the institution 
is a member of one of the ten leading bank holding companies (as of 1996)9 of the 
country and zero for all other institutions; a negative sign on this term may suggest 
holding-company-level scale economies, while a positive sign would be consistent with 
anticompetitive impacts associated with multi-market contacts among large ﬁ  rms.
Finally, in addition to quarterly dummies included to test for seasonal effects, we 
include a credit union dummy variable (CU) which will help to answer the question 
posed in the title of this paper. That is, while it is often thought that credit unions 
charge lower interest rates than banks, we test to see if this remains true when we 
control for the market and institutional factors mentioned above.
DATA SOURCES AND MEASUREMENT ISSUES
Data on bank loan rates10 were obtained (via a Freedom of Information Act re-
quest) from the Federal Reserve Board’s Quarterly Report of Interest Rates on Selected 
Direct Consumer Installment Loans. Credit union loan rates were collected from the 
National Credit Union Administration web site. Local market structure data were 
obtained from Sheshunoff Information Services for the 1992-98 period.11 The two loan 
rates examined are those for 48-month new auto loans and for 24-month non-credit 
card unsecured consumer loans; these types of loans are the only ones reported on in 
both the Fed survey and the NCUA database. 
Both loans have obvious limitations for study: the unsecured loans are typically 
quite small (in the $1,000 to $5,000 range) and are not a signiﬁ  cant part of the loan 
portfolio of most banks or credit unions, leading to the possibility that price determi-
nation on these loans reﬂ  ects broader institutional concerns rather than market- and 
product-speciﬁ  c economic factors;12 given the important role of automobile ﬁ  nance 
companies, often tied to manufacturers, in the market for car loans it is clear that our 
measures of market concentration and market shares (based only on banks, thrifts, 
and credit unions) will overstate the true ﬁ  gures.13 Nevertheless, we expect that these 
problems will simply make it more difﬁ  cult to observe impacts of market structure, 
leading to our results having a somewhat conservative interpretation. As a practical 
matter, the two loans are the only ones for which historical institution-level data are 
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We included 68 markets in our analysis (listed in Appendix 1), 63 Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas (MSAs) and 5 rural counties (the imbalance towards MSAs reﬂ  ects 
the available data on bank loan rates from the Fed survey). These are not randomly 
chosen, but rather reﬂ  ect data availability. The markets vary tremendously in size 
from Atchison County, Kansas to New York City. From each of these markets up to 
two large credit unions and one small credit union were included in the sample. From 
the Fed survey, we have between 1 and 3 banks in each market. The total number 
of institutions in the sample is 287, of which 100 are commercial banks and 187 are 
credit unions.
The loan rate data used here are quarterly, from the 2nd quarter of 1992 to the 
4th quarter of 1998. For 110 smaller credit unions (with an asset value less than 50 
million dollars) data are reported to NCUA semi-annually, and for these – to ﬁ  ll out 
missing quarters -- we have averaged preceding and following values. We prefer to 
include these smaller credit unions to have a wider range of institution sizes in our 
sample. However, given our interest in dynamic effects, and the possibility that this 
averaging may be biasing the effects of lagged rates, we run the model both with and 
without these smaller credit unions; our sample size without these smaller credit 
unions is 177 combined institutions (of which 77 are credit unions). In addition, bank 
loan rates are reported at the middle of each quarter but credit union data are reported 
as of the end of the quarter. We have averaged current and one-quarter lagged credit 
union loan rates to put them on a comparable time basis with bank loan rates. Mar-
ket structure variables are only available annually; we used smoothing techniques 
to create quarterly series.14
It should be noted that while the dependent variables reﬂ  ect loan rates on products 
representing varying shares of each institution’s portfolio (and likely quite small for 
banks), the market structure variables are developed from the institution’s deposit 
position. On the one hand this may be seen as introducing measurement error into 
the estimation; however, on the other hand, deposit shares may be interpreted as 
instruments which deal with the potential simultaneity, often noted in critiques of 
structure-performance studies, between price or proﬁ  t rates and market shares. In 
the current context it is hard to imagine a bank’s choice of loan rate on unsecured or 
auto loans having any signiﬁ  cant effect on its deposits (while there may be more of a 
link for credit unions in terms of attracting members the causal impact on deposits 
is unlikely to be signiﬁ  cant).
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Descriptive statistics (presented separately for banks and credit unions) are 
presented in Tables 1, 2, and 3 (the latter presenting data on only the larger credit 
unions reporting quarterly). Note there the tremendous variation both within and 
across institutional types in size and market shares. In particular, while clearly most 
banks are larger than most credit unions, there is considerable overlap and it is not 
uncommon for credit unions in our sample to be larger than some banks in the same 
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 TABLE  1
  Descriptive Statistics (Banks Only)
  DEP ($million)  CR3  MS  STCUSHARE  USL  NVL
Mean  4323  52.4 16.4 30.6 13.7  8.7
Maximum  83800 89.3 46.9  111.7 22.8 15.0
Minimum  66  24.8 0.13  8.6 5.0 5.9
Observations  2201  2201 2201 2201 2201 2201
Cross  sections 100  100 100 100 100 100
 TABLE  2
  Descriptive Statistics (Credit Unions Only)
  DEP ($million)  CR3  MS  STCUSHARE  USL  NVL
Mean  131.4  53.8  1.0 29.0 13.4  8.0
Maximum  2693.2  92.5 27.8  111.7 19.7 16.0
Minimum  0.16  24.8 0.01  8.6 6.8 5.3
Observations  4530 4530 4530 4530  4530 4530
Cross  sections  187 187 187 187  187 187
 TABLE  3
 Descriptive  Statistics 
  (Credit Unions, including Only those Reporting Quarterly)
  DEP ($million)  CR3  MS  STCUSHARE  USL  NVL
Mean  296.0  51.9  1.8 29.4 13.5  7.8
Maximum  2693.2  81.4 27.8  111.7 19.0 12.4
Minimum  42.8  28.2 0.04  15.2 7.0 5.3
Observations  1908 1908 1908 1908  1908 1908
Cross  sections  77 77 77 77  77 77
Table 4 presents our major regression results – estimating the pooled random-
effects GLS model (with adjustment for autocorrelation and an instrumental vari-
able for the lagged loan rate) on the combined sample of banks and credit unions to 
explain unsecured loan rates (USL) and new vehicle loan rates (NVL).15 First, note 
that while institution deposit size has no statistically signiﬁ  cant effect on unsecured 
loan rates, for new vehicle loan rates the effect is negative, consistent with a scale 
economy argument (though this effect disappears when only the quarterly reporting 
credit unions are included).16 
Market concentration has been found in previous empirical work to have an 
ambiguous effect after ﬁ  rm-level effects have been controlled for; here we ﬁ  nd con-
centration, measured as the deposit market share of the top three institutions, to 
have a signiﬁ  cant positive effect only for NVL (and only when all credit unions are 
included), with signiﬁ  cant negative impacts for unsecured loan rates. Institution 
market shares never have the predicted positive impact on loan rates, and in fact 
the estimated negative coefﬁ  cient for unsecured loan rates is statistically signiﬁ  cant 
when only the quarterly reporting credit unions are included. The negative impacts 
of market concentration and institution-level market shares may be capturing scale 
economy impacts not picked up by the deposit size measure; in addition, the lack of 
these “market power” effects may reﬂ  ect the large number of credit unions in our 
sample -- their lack of a proﬁ  t motive may imply no rationale for greater potential 
market power to translate into higher rates. 653 ARE CREDIT UNIONS JUST SMALL BANKS?
 TABLE  4 
  Instrumental Variable Generalized Least Squares Regression Results 
 with Autocorrelation Adjustment (Combined Sample) – Random Effects; 
  All Variables in Logs
  All CUs included     Only quarterly reporting 
   CUs  included
Variables  USL NVL USL  NVL
Constant 1.158  0.629  1.920  0.818
  (3.44) (6.02) (3.89)  (6.16)
Deposit Size  0.0022  -0.0061  0.0077  0.0006
  (0.43) (2.37) (0.93)  (0.17)
CR3 -0.052  0.046  -0.084  0.016
  (1.78) (2.93) (2.02)  (0.82)
Market  Share  -0.0060 -0.0043 -0.0220  -0.0050
  (1.21) (1.54) (2.13)  (1.04)
Cost of Funds  0.043  0.205  0.107  0.336
 (3.01)  (16.73)  (5.25)  (23.06)
State CU Share  0.0045  -0.048  0.014  -0.048
  (0.21) (4.68) (0.51)  (4.08)
Lag  Rate  0.594 0.620 0.288  0.453
 (5.04)  (18.64)  (1.65)  (10.76)
CU  Dummy  -0.010 -0.114 -0.032  -0.112
  (0.40) (9.35) (1.00)  (7.64)
BHC  Dummy 0.052 0.035 0.052  0.030
  (2.53) (2.79) (2.30)  (2.48)
QD2  -0.0021 -0.0018 -0.0048  -0.0060
  (0.97) (1.35) (1.43)  (3.24)
QD3  -0.0033 -0.0050 -0.0089  -0.0110
  (1.15) (2.79) (2.00)  (4.65)
QD4 0.0025  -0.0084  0.0021  -0.0120
  (0.82) (4.40) (0.44)  (4.67)
R-squared  0.03 0.29 0.05  0.44 
Rho  0.74 0.83 0.70  0.77
Cross sections  287  287  287  287
Observations 6874  6812  4224  4141
z-statistics in parentheses below estimated coefﬁ  cient
Cost of funds, as expected, has a strong positive coefﬁ  cient for both loan rates, 
whether the smaller credit unions reporting semiannually are included or not. A 
natural concern to raise is that of possible non-stationarity of the loan rate and cost 
of funds series, and cointegration between them. However, it is important to note the 
limited time series nature of the panel (with 24 time series observations versus 187 
cross sectional observations); furthermore there is little apparent trend in the cost of 
funds proxy over the time period investigated,17 and the simple correlation between 
the loan rate series and cost is fairly modest (0.3) for new vehicle loans, virtually zero 
for unsecured loans. 
The state-level credit union penetration share has no signiﬁ  cant effect on unse-
cured loan rates, but a signiﬁ  cant negative impact on new vehicle loan rates (again, 
with or without the semi-annually reporting credit unions). This result is consistent 
with the threat of entry helping to discipline pricing for new vehicle loans. The lagged 
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of loans, though somewhat smaller for both when the semi-annually reporting credit 
unions are excluded.18 A considerable degree of inertia in rate-setting is suggested 
for both types of loans, with an implied one-quarter adjustment of between 40 and 
70 percent of the optimal adjustment. 
Several of the dummy variable coefﬁ  cients are of particular interest. The quarterly 
dummies suggest a strong seasonal pattern to new vehicle loans, with rates lowest 
in the third and fourth quarters (perhaps due to competition from manufacturer-tied 
auto ﬁ  nance companies pushing to unload end-of-model-year vehicles and promote the 
new models). The bank holding company dummy variable is positive and signiﬁ  cant 
for both types of loans, for both samples. This ﬁ  nding is consistent with price-increas-
ing impacts of multi-market contact among large ﬁ  rms, as discussed by Alexander 
[1985], Feinberg [1985], Bernheim and Whinston [1990], and Hannan and Prager 
[2001], among others.
After controlling for the market and institutional variables discussed above, the 
estimated coefﬁ  cient of the CU dummy variable should answer the question posed in 
the title of this paper. That is, given two ﬁ  nancial institutions of the same deposit size 
(in a particular market), having the same cost of funds, and facing the same market 
structure conditions – including the same share of the market – will consumer loan 
pricing differ if one is a bank and the other a credit union? For new vehicle loans, the 
answer seems clearly to be yes, with credit union loan rates on these loans signiﬁ  -
cantly lower (whether or not only the quarterly reporting credit unions are included 
in the sample). The roughly 11 percent reduction in new vehicle loan rates due to 
credit union status implies a roughly 0.9 percentage point reduction in new vehicle 
rates. As noted above, if we divide this by the estimated adjustment parameters, the 
impact on “fully-adjusted” loan rates of credit union status is between 1.6 and 2.4 
percentage points. This result is consistent with the stated objectives of credit unions 
to pool members’ savings and (perhaps by being better able to monitor repayment or 
by using “moral suasion” to guarantee repayment) extend loans to them at a low cost. 
However, for unsecured loans we do not ﬁ  nd a signiﬁ  cant difference between bank 
and credit union pricing.
While the CU dummy variable identiﬁ  es a ceteris paribus effect of credit unions 
on loan pricing, the model discussed above restricts this effect purely to changing the 
intercept term of the loan pricing equations. A more general alternative is found in 
Tables 5 and 6, where we replicate the analysis (dropping certain dummy variables 
for obvious reasons) on separate sub-samples of banks and credit unions. Compar-
ing the estimated coefﬁ  cients presented in those tables, we see that banks’ response 
to deposit size is very different than that of credit unions. Increasing bank deposits 
raises both loan rates, while increasing credit union deposits reduces both loan rates 
(all effects at least weakly signiﬁ  cant). The bank response suggests that bank deposits 
in a market may reﬂ  ect market size (and perhaps omitted variables correlated with 
that – operating expenses such as ofﬁ  ce rentals may be one) while the credit union 
impact is consistent with the anticipated scale economy impact.655 ARE CREDIT UNIONS JUST SMALL BANKS?
  TABLE 5
  Instrumental Variable Generalized Least Squares Regression Results 
  with Autocorrelation Adjustment (Bank Sample) – Random Effects; 
  All Variables in Logs
Variables USL  NVL
Constant 1.944  0.847     
 (2.77)  (5.12)
Deposit Size  0.022  0.010
 (2.30)  (2.37)
CR3 -0.072  0.060
 (1.26)  (2.35)
Market Share  -0.028  -0.0056
 (1.86)  (0.81)
Cost of Funds  0.140  0.384
 (3.23)  (14.24)
State CU Share  0.062  -0.046
 (1.87)  (3.29)
Lag Rate  0.108  0.256
 (0.41)  (4.17)
BHC Dummy  0.052  0.027
 (2.05)  (2.30)
QD2 -0.0077  -0.010
 (1.34)  (3.53)
QD3 -0.016  -0.018
 (2.11)  (4.81)
QD4 0.0038  -0.019
 (0.48)  (4.62)
R-squared 0.10  0.41
Rho 0.65  0.71
Cross sections  100  100
Observations 2318  2235
z-statistics in parentheses below estimated coefﬁ  cient
Market concentration and market shares have either insigniﬁ  cant or negative 
effects for both banks and credit unions on loan rates for unsecured loans; for new 
vehicle loans there is a signiﬁ  cant positive impact of concentration for banks, and a 
mixed effect for credit unions (depending on whether the small “semiannual reporters” 
are included or not). The state credit union share has the expected negative impact 
for both bank and credit union new vehicle loan rates (twice as large for banks as for 
credit unions) but a puzzling positive impact on bank unsecured loans. The coefﬁ  -
cient of the cost of funds variable is positive and signiﬁ  cant for both banks and credit 
unions, though larger for banks (perhaps consistent with a more direct response by 
banks to changes in economic conditions in their loan pricing strategy). For both banks 
and credit unions, the impact of cost of funds is larger for new vehicle loans than for 
unsecured loans. The bank holding company dummy variable continues to have a 
signiﬁ  cant positive impact in explaining both loan rates.
Considered separately, we see a much larger coefﬁ  cient on lagged rates for credit 
unions than for banks for both types of loans, suggesting greater inertia in decision-
making by credit unions. For example, for new vehicle loans, the implied inertia 
parameter is .74 for banks and between .36 and .43 for credit unions (i.e., 21 percent 656 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
of optimal adjustment made in actual one-quarter price changes by banks vs. roughly 
40 percent by credit unions). This may result from volunteer credit union boards 
meeting only infrequently to discuss changes in loan rates, or less of a perceived need 
to respond to market conditions by credit unions, rather than the more immediate 
response to changing market conditions expected to emerge at banks.
 TABLE  6
  Instrumental Variable Generalized Least Squares Regression Results 
  with Autocorrelation Adjustment (Credit Union Sample)
  – Random Effects; All Variables in Logs
  All CUs included     Only quarterly reporting 
   CUs  included
Variables  USL NVL USL NVL
Constant 1.348  0.670  1.833  1.224
  (5.18) (5.72) (3.20)  (6.61)
Deposit Size  -0.0048  -0.013  -0.025  -0.029
  (1.58) (4.31) (1.58)  (3.71)
CR3 -0.017  0.034  -0.060  -0.062
  (0.56) (1.80) (1.13)  (2.10)
Market  Share  0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0066  -0.0025
  (0.34) (0.47) (0.47)  (0.38)
Cost of Funds  0.035  0.161  0.063  0.246
 (2.69)  (12.27)  (2.82)  (12.57)
State CU Share  -0.046  -0.044  -0.057  -0.025
  (1.77) (3.35) (1.35)  (1.31)
Lag  Rate  0.563 0.636 0.542  0.567
 (7.12)  (19.29)  (2.83)  (12.98)
QD2 -0.0010  0.0003  -0.0015  -0.0008
  (0.78) (0.25) (0.64)  (0.40)
QD3 0.0003  0.0000  -0.0022  -0.0058
  (0.15) (0.01) (0.66)  (2.07)
QD4  0.0002 -0.0028 -0.0017  -0.0076
  (0.12) (1.40) (0.49)  (2.56)
R-squared  0.02 0.18 0.07  0.30 
Rho  0.87 0.87 0.85  0.84
Cross sections  187  187   77   77
Observations 4556  4577  1906  1906
z-statistics in parentheses below estimated coefﬁ  cient
CONCLUSIONS
This paper ﬁ  nds that, despite common inﬂ  uences on their pricing, banks and credit 
unions behave differently in local markets for consumer loans. Controlling for market 
and ﬁ  rm-level factors, credit union new vehicle loan rates are roughly 2 percentage 
points lower than bank loan rates, after a full adjustment is made to changed economic 
conditions. This is not surprising as credit unions are non-proﬁ  t organizations and the 
nature of competition between credit unions and banks may be somewhat complicated 
for that reason. Another major difference observed -- the apparently greater inertia 
in pricing by credit unions -- is likely the result of their organizational form, as is the 
weaker link between market concentration and new vehicle loan rates. Understanding 
the causes of these differences in behavior will require further study.657 ARE CREDIT UNIONS JUST SMALL BANKS?
Another result of interest is that market and institutional variables seem to have 
less predictable impacts – for both banks and credit unions – in explaining unsecured 
loan rates than in explaining new vehicle loans. This may be due to the relative unim-
portance to banks (and even to larger credit unions) of unsecured loans; in fact, these 
loans may be viewed by ﬁ  nancial institutions (especially banks) more as a convenience 
to depositors than as product on which a return should be earned (considered sepa-
rately from other institutional products). From this perspective, our results support 
the argument of Gilbert [1984] and other researchers that interest rates should be 
analyzed individually – with each having different sets of determinants.
Our results have important implications for policy. On the one hand, as previ-
ous work has noted, banks and credit unions are substitutable in the market for 
consumer loans, suggesting that considering the credit union presence in a market 
when evaluating antitrust implications of bank mergers is essential.19 On the other 
hand, the fact that credit unions and banks do seem to have unique determinants of 
loan rates emphasizes that these institutions are not perfect substitutes, and antitrust 
and banking overseers should not assume that the potential competition from credit 
unions (and by analogy other smaller ﬁ  nancial institution types) will be sufﬁ  cient to 
provide competitive discipline in banking markets.
 APPENDIX  1
  List of included markets
Albany, NY  Fargo, ND  New York, NY
Amarillo, TX  Ford County, KS  Oklahoma City, OK
Anchorage, AK  Fort Wayne, IN  Omaha, NE
Atchison County, KS  Fort Pierce-Port St. Lucie, FL  Peoria, IL
Atlanta, GA  Grand Rapids, MI  Philadelphia, PA
Baton Rouge, LA  Greensboro, NC  Pittsburgh, PA
Billings, MT  Hartford, CT  Portland, ME
Birmingham, AL  Houston, TX  Providence, RI
Boston, MA  Huntington, WV  Reno, NV
Buffalo, NY  Indianapolis, IN  Richmond, VA
Burlington, VT  Johnstown, PA  Roanoke, VA
Charlotte, NC  Lafayette, LA  Rochester, NY
Chicago, IL  Little Rock, AR  St. Louis, MO
Cincinnati, OH  Louisville, KY  Salt Lake City, UT
Cleveland, OH  Lynchburg, VA  San Francisco, CA
Columbus, OH  Macon, GA  Seattle, WA
Dallas, TX  Mansﬁ  eld, OH  Sioux City, IA
Dayton, OH  Marquette County, MI  Sussex County, DE
Denver, CO  Memphis, TN  Tulsa, OK
Des Moines, IA  Milwaukee, WI  Victoria, TX
Detroit, MI  Minneapolis, MN  Wichita, KS
El Paso, TX  Nacogdoches County, TX  Youngstown, OH
Evansville, IN  Nashville, TN 658 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
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Wisconsin--Madison. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the ASSA annual meetings in 
Washington, DC, January 2003.
1.   Emmons and Schmid [2004] develop a model of bank/credit union interaction and identify empirically 
local economic factors inﬂ  uencing the nature of the competition between the two types of institu-
tions.
2.   While innovations in technology have led some to the view that all lending markets are national, 
Simons and Stavins [1998] present evidence suggesting that banking markets are still predominately 
local in nature. They point to the Federal Reserve Board’s 1992 Survey of Consumer Finances which 
shows that 94.1 percent of households using a ﬁ  nancial institution identiﬁ  ed a local institution as 
their primary provider of ﬁ  nancial services; both deposit accounts and sources of credit were primarily 
local in nature. More recently though, Amel and Starr-McCluer [2002] have noted (examining more 
recent versions of that survey) that consumer loans – especially new-vehicle loans – became less lo-
cally limited during the 1990s.
3.   A better discussion of credit union growth and evolution can be found in Burger and Nacil [1992].
4.   Hart and Moore [1998] have a detailed analysis of the differences in objective functions and governance 
structures between non-proﬁ  t and for-proﬁ  t ﬁ  rms.
5.   Instruments used were two lagged values of the cost of funds. The results without instrumenting for 
the lagged loan rates were quite similar.
6.   A preliminary investigation of the data found the new vehicle loan rates to be approximately log-
normally distributed (while the unsecured loan rates were a bit closer to being distributed normally). 
In preliminary work we also tried a measure of state-level personal income growth as a proxy for the 
state of demand; this variable did not seem to play an important role in loan rate determination.
7.   While  MS, DEP and CR3 are all based on deposits within a market, they are not highly correlated 
with each other due to the pooling of institutions of varying size in markets of varying size over time. 
Over the entire sample, the correlation coefﬁ  cient of CR3 with DEP is -0.06, with MS it is +0.07. The 
correlation coefﬁ  cient between DEP and MS is higher, at 0.40, and this may suggest that disentan-
gling separate inﬂ  uences may be difﬁ  cult, but given the large sample size this should not be a major 
problem.
8.   In the micro banking literature authors have alternatively used CR2, CR3, and the Herﬁ  ndahl 
Index to measure market power – results are generally not sensitive to the choice of market power 
variables.
9.   They are Chase Manhattan, Citicorp, BankAmerica, JP Morgan, Nations bank, First Union, First 
Chicago NBD, Bankers Trust, Bank One and Norwest. As banks were acquired during the period by 
these bank holding companies, there is some variation in this dummy variable over time.
10.   These are for commercial banks, both federally and state chartered, and the loan rates are speciﬁ  c to 
the particular market in question (i.e., NationsBank is not asked for a single loan rate for all markets 
in which they operate).
11.   We must acknowledge some difﬁ  culty in accurately determining credit union market shares and de-
posit size; all deposits are allocated to local markets in which their main ofﬁ  ces are found (as opposed 
to the bank deposit data which is speciﬁ  c to branches in a particular market). However, some credit 
unions have branches in multiple local markets – we have tried to deal with this by deleting from our 
sample credit unions which we expect to have signiﬁ  cant deposits outside home markets, and some 
markets in which such credit unions would distort deposit market shares.
12.   Anecdotally, an economist for a major bank (encountered in an airport check-in line) claimed that 
small unsecured loans are provided more as a convenience to customers than as a direct contribution 
to proﬁ  ts.
13.   A similar problem for unsecured loans results from the omission of consumer ﬁ  nance companies and 
pawnshops.
14.   We initially distributed the annual ﬁ  gure for all four quarters, and then applied a 3-quarter centered 
moving average. This has the practical effect of making the second and third quarter values equal 659 ARE CREDIT UNIONS JUST SMALL BANKS?
to the annual ﬁ  gure while 1st and 4th quarter values are averages of current and past or future year 
values. 
15.  As noted above, we do not have measures of actual bank cost of funds, but rather just a national aver-
age proxy for this, so calculating a price-cost margin or spread variable (as an alternate dependent 
variable) is not possible.
16.   Hannan and Liang [1995] also found some evidence in support of scale economies in explaining both 
unsecured and secured loan rates. 
17.   An Augmented Dickey Fuller test on the full 24 observations of cost narrowly fails to reject non-sta-
tionarity, but rejects this at 5 percent if the ﬁ  rst two quarters of data are dropped.
18.  We expect that our adjustments for autocorrelation, combined with the instrumental variables ap-
proach to endogeneity of the lagged loan rate term should produce consistent estimates. However, 
preliminary estimates using the Arellano-Bond linear dynamic panel estimator, a Generalized Method 
of Moments approach, yielded similar results – we did not report those results because the required 
ﬁ  rst-differencing of data eliminated the credit union dummy variable of particular interest to us.
19.  Furthermore, results showing ease of credit union entry to discipline bank loan rates also argue for 
regulatory policies reducing barriers to entry of ﬁ  nancial depository institutions of all types.
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